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such as found in the instant case, is a wilful and malicious injury to
property and is not discharged by bankruptcy. Illinois statutory and case
law, as well as the Uniform Commercial Code, are substantially in accord
with this view. However, even in jurisdictions holding to the majority
view, there is no unanimity in the basis for their holding. Some of these
courts put greater emphasis on the actor's intent, state of mind, and his
reason for the conversion, while other courts give only passing attention
to the tortfeasor's intent or wilfulness, but place their emphasis on the
act of conversion itself looking primarily to the injury to property or
property rights.
The instant case may be distinguished from earlier Illinois decisions
on wilful and malicious injury to property as constituting a bar to a
discharge in bankruptcy, in that these earlier decisions stressed the actor's
intent, emphasizing the wilfulness and maliciousness of the act. The
Padjen decision paid little note to how wilful or malicious the conversion
was, but emphasized the injury to the mortgagee's property right in the
secured chattel on account of the mortgagor's conversion of such chattel.
Perhaps the court was influenced largely by Illinois statutory law, and
the Uniform Commercial Code, which recognizes that a mortgagee has a
protectable property right in mortgaged property, and which contains
various provisions designed to protect the holder of a security interest
against conversion of the secured property by a mortgagor.
Joel Lipscher
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR-
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO BELIEVE IN
SUPREME BEING
Irving Stolberg was denied conscientious objector status by his local
draft board. Acting upon the recommendation of the Department of Jus-
tice, the appeal board sustained his 1-A classification. Stolberg refused to
submit to induction and was convicted of violating the Universal Military
Training and Service Act.' He appealed from said decision, and the court
of appeals reversed, granting him the conscientious objection exemption
despite the fact that he did not believe "the Supreme Being constituted a
force outside of man."'2 United States v. Stolberg, 346 F.2d 363 (7th Cir.
1965).
1Universal Military Training and Service Act. §6(j), Stat. (1948), 50 U.S.C.
§ 456(j) (1964).
2 United States v. Stolberg, 346 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1965).
CASE NOTES
The Stolberg case initiates a trend of conformance to the judicial man-
date issued by the Supreme Court in United States v. Seeger.3 The mandate
stated that a "sincere and meaningful belief [which] occupies a place in the
life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God"
qualifies one to receive the conscientious objector exemption. However, in
restricting its discussion to sincere and meaningful beliefs, the Court by-
passed the following two issues which are implicit in a contemporary con-
sideration of the conscientious objection: whether atheistic views are ac-
ceptable to the dictates of section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training
and Service Act; 5 and whether section 6(j) is repugnant to the first and
fifth amendments of the federal constitution. The Stolberg decision, by its
lack of comment on the above two issues, conforms to the mandate.
Such conformance has a four-fold result: section 6(j), which bases the
conferral of conscientious objector status on belief in a Supreme Being, was
usurped, and the requisite of "religious belief" as demanded by the 1940
Act6 was reinstated; the definition of a "religious belief" as set out in
United States v. Kauter7 was reestablished as the applicable criteria for
determining whether one qualifies for exemption; agnostic views were cer-
tified as being acceptable for conscientious objection; and the question of
whether 6(j) is repugnant to the first and fifth amendments of the federal
constitution was considered premature for judicial interpretation.
The usurpation of section 6(j) in favor of the 1940 Act was brought
about through judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court, in deciding the
Seeger case, was faced with the problem of interpreting the conscientious
a United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1963), wherein the mandate is stated
as follows: ". . . Congress in using the expression Supreme Being [was] clarifying the
meaning of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions. [Ulnder this
construction, the test of belief ... is whether a given belief that is sincere and mean-
ingful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God . . ." (emphasis added).
4 Ibid.
5 Supra note 1 at S 456(j), which allows an exemption to conscientious objectors.
The section defines "religious training and belief" as "an individual's belief in relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from an human rela-
tion, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or
a merely personal moral code."
658 Stat. 136 (1940), 50 U.S.C. § 305(g) (1940), wherein no person was to be sub-
jected to training and service by reason of religious training or belief.
7 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). "Religious belief" was defined as that which "arises
from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individual to his
fellow men and to his universe-a sense common to men in the most primitive and in
the most highly civilized societies. It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited
by it. It is a belief finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires the
believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martydom in preference to
transgressing its tenets." (d. at 708).
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objector provision with respect to three petitioners whose deistic concepts
(though religious in orientation) were by no means equivalent to the tra-
ditional interpretation of God demanded by 6(j). s The Court solved the
dilemma by considering a sincere and meaningful religious belief, which
occupied a position "parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God,"9
to be sufficient to satisfy the statute. Conscientious objector status was
granted all three petitioners. The Court's failure to enforce the Supreme
Being requirement not only resulted in the usurpation of section 6(j), but
also the revival of the "religious belief" criteria as set out in section 5 (g)
of the 1940 Act.' 0 The Court's intent to bring about the usurpation is
clearly evidenced by Justice Clark's reference to the Senate report on sec-
tion 6(j), which specifically stated that it "was intended to re-enact sub-
stantially the same provisions as were found in the 1940 Act [which] refers
to religious training and belief without more."" The Court justifies its re-
jection of the Supreme Being test by stating that "the history of the act
belies the notion that it was to be . . . available only to those believing in a
traditional God."'1 2 However, the rejection of section 6(j) is supported
not only by "the history of the act,"'13 but by decisions conferring con-
scientious objector status on the basis of a sincere religious belief 14 (as
8 In United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), petitioner refused to assert
a simple belief or disbelief in a deity. He said he respected and believed in devotion
to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical
creed. In United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), the petitioner insisted
that man could know nothing about God, because God was "unknowable" to man.
In Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963), petitioner stated he felt "love"
towards other human beings and other living objects, and insisted that this feeling was
equivalent to a belief in a Supreme Being or God.
9 Supra note 3. 10 Supra note 6. 11 Supra note 3 at 176 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 178. The Supreme Being clause was an innovation. It had no predecessor in
any of the colonial provisions, those of the Civil War, or the draft laws of either
World War. The first federal conscription act was adopted in 1863 without any pro-
vision specifically exempting conscientious objectors. 12 Stat. 731 (1863). However,
in 1864, Congress enacted a provision stating that members of religious denominations
whose articles of faith prohibited the bearing of arms, could, upon affirmation of their
conscientious objection and the payment of $300, be exempt from combatant military
service. 13 Stat. 9 (1864). In the Selective Service Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 78 (1917),
Congress provided an exemption limited to members of any well-recognized sect or
organization whose existing creed forbade its members to participate in war in any
form. The burden was placed on the individual registrant to show that his personal
religious convictions against war were aligned with the creed of his pacifist church.
The Selective Service Act of 1940, supra note 6, ended the necessity of the conscientious
objector being a member of a pacifist church and broadened the possibility for exemp-
tion to include anyone who by reason of religious training and belief had conscientious
scruples against participation in war.
13 Ibid.
14 See, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955) and Sicurella v. United
States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955), wherein the applioants' sincerity is the question. See also,
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opposed to belief in a Supreme Being), and by scholarly commentaries
condemning the Supreme Being test as being repugnant to the first and
fifth amendments of the Constitution. 5
The usurpation actually occurred when the Stolberg court granted the
conscientious objector exemption on the basis of an "opposition to com-
bat [and a religious belief regarding] human life [as] essential."' 6 The re-
quirement of the conscientious objector provisions were thereby satisfied
in the Stolberg case, but such language, while applicable to section 5 (g) of
the 1940 Act, is in opposition to the language of section 6(j).
Stolberg's compliance with the Supreme Court decision not only ratified
the usurpation of section 6(j), but re-established the definition of "reli-
gious belief" set out in United States v. Kauten.1 Prior to the enactment
of section 6(j), there existed a judicial dispute as to what constituted "re-
ligious belief" as demanded by the conscientious objector statute. The
Second Circuit followed the Kauten case criteria, defining the belief as one
which disregards "elementary self interest and [accepts] martyrdom in
preference to transgressing its tenets."'18 The Ninth Circuit, however, rely-
ing on the definition set down in Berman v. United States,'9 specifically
based "religious belief" on a Supreme Being whose "power [is] distinct and
above human reason." 20 This dispute was seemingly resolved (in favor of
the Berman definition) by the 1948 Congressional amendment of section
6(j) which is worded substantially in the same terms employed by the
Court in the Berman case. 21 However, issue was again drawn to the dis-
United States v. Hinkle, 348 U.S. 970 (1955); Williams v. United States, 216 F.2d 350
(5th Cir. 1954); Gonzales v. United States, 212 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1954), rev'd., 348 U.S.
407 (1954); United States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1953); Roberson v.
United States, 208 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1953); Tafts v. United States, 208 F.2d 329
(8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954); Head v. United States, 199 F.2d
337 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 910 (1953); Artherton v. United States,
176 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 938 (1949); United States v.
Knappke, 125 F.Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1955); United States v. Bortlik, 122 F.Supp. 225
(M.D. Pa. 1954); United States v. DeLime, 121 F.Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1954), aff'd, 223
F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1955); United States v. Heni, 112 F.Supp. 71 (1953).
15 See, e.g., Conklin, A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEO. L.J. 252
(1963); Clancy & Weiss, Problems in Conceptual Clarity, 17 MAINE L. REV. 150 (1965);
Rabin, Wben is Religious Belief Religious, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 237 (1966); Tiltz, Deity
Belief, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 529 (1965). See also, Comment, 18 RUTERS L. REv. 925
(1964); Comment, 50 VA. L. REV. 178 (1964).
16 Supra note 2 at 364. 17 Supra note 7. 18 Id. at 708.
19 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
201d. at 381.
21 Both Congress and the Berman Court relied on Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1930), wherein he stated that "the essence
of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relations." (ld. at 633-34).
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pute by a trilogy of cases tried subsequent to 1948. The cases22 were tried
in the Second and Ninth Circuits, with both circuits respectively relying
on the Kauten and Berman definitions of "religious belief." The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and the trilogy was determined in one decision,
United States v. Seeger,.3 In handing down its decision, the Supreme Court
not only caused the usurpation of section 6(j), but unequivocably rejected
the Berman definition of religious belief in favor of the Kauten case cri-
teria.24 The Stolberg court, by granting an exemption to a petitioner who
"did not believe [that] the Supreme Being constituted a force outside of
man,"'125 displayed judicial sanctification of the Supreme Court's edict that
the Kauten case is once again the applicable test in determining whether or
not one qualifies for conscientious objector status.
The Stolberg court's adherence to the Supreme Court mandate not only
establishes sincere "religious belief" as the only requisite to the conferral
of conscientious objector status, but in effect certifies agnostic beliefs as
acceptable for the conscientious exemption. The granting of conscientious
objector status to an agnostic is not limited to recent case development. In
1943, the Court, in U.S. ex rel. Philips v. Downer,26 employing the Kauten
definition of religious belief,-conferred conscientious objector status on an
admitted agnostic whose opposition to war was "deep rooted, based not
on political grounds but on general humanitarian concept. '27 In 1944, the
Kauten case rationale was again employed to grant exemptions to two peti-
tioners whose religious views classified them as agnostic.2 8 However, none
of the above cases discussed atheistic versus theistic views in relation to
conscientious objectors. In essence, the courts chose to circumvent peti-
tioner' doubts, as to the existence of a traditional God, by finding a sincere
"religious belief" which qualified them for exemption under the criteria
established in the Kauten case. However, in granting exemption to the
petitioners in the Seeger case, the Supreme Court expressly avoided the is-
sue of whether an absolute belief in a Supreme Being is a necessary inci-
dent to the granting of conscientious objector status.2 9 The effect of said
silence, in light of the fact that the petitioner's "deistic beliefs" readily fit
the traditional definition of agnostic,30 viewed along with the usurpation
22 United States v. Jakobson, supra note 8, and Peter v. United States, supra note 8.
23 Supra note 3. 24 Supra note 7. 25 Supra note 2 at 365.
20 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943). 27 1d. at 523.
28 U.S. ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944); U.S. ex. rel. Branden v.
Downer, 139 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1944).
29 Supra note 3 at 173: "The question is not .. .one between theistic and atheistic
beliefs. [We] do not deal with or intimate any decisions on that situation in this case."
30 An agnostic is one "who maintains a continuing doubt about the existence of
God or any ultimate [and applies] to one who does not take an orthodox religious
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of the "Supreme Being" test inherent to section 6(j), leads to the conclu-
sion that the Court has offered to the judiciary the discretionary power of
granting conscientious objector status to an agnostic. The only requisite
to such a conferral is an agnostic belief "parallel [to that] of the orthodox
belief in God."' The Stolberg court, by exempting a petitioner who "does
not believe the Supreme Being constitutes a force outside of man,"32 dis-
plays an acceptance of the Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Seeger.
With the exceptions of the Draft Law Cases"a (dealing with the 1917
Conscription Act) and the lower court Seeger decision,3 4 the judiciary has
summarily refused to consider the constitutionality of a conscientious ob-
jector statute based on either a "religious belief," or belief in a Supreme
Being.' 5 The mere fact that Stolberg follows this pattern would have been
of no startling importance had it not been for the Supreme Court decision
with which it so completely agrees. The Court, when afforded the oppor-
tunity, refused to offer any commentary on the constitutionality of an
exemption to military service based on religious grounds.' 6 Everson v.
Board of Education37 ruled that "neither State nor Federal Government
can pass laws which aid one religion and [or] all religions.""8 Torcaso v.
Watkins" held that a statute demanding belief in a Supreme Being as requi-
position." WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961). Webster's indi-
cates that "atheist" is synonymous with "agnostic," and this argument is set out in
Davidson v. United States, 218 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1953).
31 Supra note 3. 32 Supra note 2.
33 See, e.g., Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 266 (1917). These cases are cited as
standing for the proposition that the Supreme Being test does not violate the guarantee
of the first amendment. See, however, KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962), wherein
the author states the first amendment issue was only one of several raised in the case,
and the Supreme Court appeared to treat the first amendment defense merely as an
insincere defensive play not worthy of real consideration.
34 Supra note 8. Seeger was granted conscientious exemption on the basis that sec-
tion 6(j) limiting the conscientious objector status to persons who believe in a Supreme
Being violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment by creating an imper-
missible classification as applied to one whose abhorrence of war was sincere and was
predicated on religious training and belief.
35 Analysis of the constitutionality of the Supreme Being test involves a considera-
tion of whether such a test violates the guarantee of the first amendment, and also
whether limiting exception to those who acknowledge belief in a Deity has a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be violative of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.
36 The issue of whether section 6(j) is unconstitutional was directly before the
Court in the Seeger case. All three petitioners argued that section 6(j) was repugnant
to both the first and fifth amendments of the Constitution, and the lower court ruled
that section 6(j) violated the guarantees of the first amendment.
'7 330 U.S. 1 (1946). "8 Id. at 8.
"9 367 U.S. 488 (1963).
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site to holding public office was unconstitutional.40 In view of these deci-
sions, the Court's silence regarding constitutionality can only be inter-
preted as a contemporary mandate directing lower courts not to become
involved with the constitutionality of section 6(j). Yet, the doctrine that
"neither [state nor federal government] can aid these religions based on a
belief in the existence of God as against . . . religions founded on different
beliefs,"'" when applied to section 6(j), implicates the unconstitutionality
of the conscientious objector provision.42
The repetitious silence of the Stolberg court, in light of the fact that it
too had the constitutional issue directly before it,43 indicates a strict ad-
herence to the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the judicial attitude to
recognize the "time honored principle of construing a statute not only to
escape unconstitutionality but to avoid grave and doubtful constitutional
questions. '44
In conclusion, it can be said of the Stolberg case that it is a vehicle by
which lawyer, jurist and litigant may evaluate current, judicial tempera-
ment in regard to the granting of the conscientious objector exemption.
Inasmuch as it is a first reaction to the Supreme Court mandate of effects
of its compliance with that edict are not conclusive. However, in view of
recent case holdings, contemporary social climate, and the unwillingness
of the Supreme Court to declare the constitutional issue regarding section
6(j) ripe for decision, it is most probable that the adherence demonstrated
by Stolberg is indeed the initiation of a modern trend of conformity to the
holding of the Supreme Court in the Seeger case.
Robert Sulnick
40 Ibid. 41 Id. at 492.
42 The doctrine has been successfully applied in School District of Abington Town-
ship, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 230 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Zorach v. Caluson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). See also,
Conklin, supra note 15.
43 Brief for Appellant, p. 4, United States v. Stolberg, supra note 2. Petitioner argued
that section 6(j) is repugnant to both the first and fifth amendments of the Constitution.
44 United States v. Jakobson, supra note 8 at 415.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-LEGITIMACY OF OFFSPRING-
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE SUBSEQUENT TO
MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIP
The plaintiff's husband died intestate survived by the plaintiff and two
children of a former marriage. Sixteen days prior to his marriage to the
plaintiff, the decedent had executed a trust agreement leaving his entire
estate to his children. The plaintiff commenced an action to set aside the
